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OBJECTIVE—To determine the scope, source, and mode of transmission of a multifacility 
outbreak of extensively drug-resistant (XDR) Acinetobacter baumannii.
DESIGN—Outbreak investigation.
SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS—Residents and patients in skilled nursing facilities, long-term 
acute-care hospital, and acute-care hospitals.
METHODS—A case was defined as the incident isolate from clinical or surveillance cultures of 
XDR Acinetobacter baumannii resistant to imipenem or meropenem and nonsusceptible to all but 
1 or 2 antibiotic classes in a patient in an Oregon healthcare facility during January 2012–
December 2014. We queried clinical laboratories, reviewed medical records, oversaw patient and 
environmental surveillance surveys at 2 facilities, and recommended interventions. Pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis (PFGE) and molecular analysis were performed.
RESULTS—We identified 21 cases, highly related by PFGE or healthcare facility exposure. 
Overall, 17 patients (81%) were admitted to either long-term acute-care hospital A (n = 8), or 
skilled nursing facility A (n = 8), or both (n = 1) prior to XDR A. baumannii isolation. Interfacility 
communication of patient or resident XDR status was not performed during transfer between 
facilities. The rare plasmid-encoded carbapenemase gene blaOXA-237 was present in 16 outbreak 
isolates. Contact precautions, chlorhexidine baths, enhanced environmental cleaning, and 
interfacility communication were implemented for cases to halt transmission.
CONCLUSIONS—Interfacility transmission of XDR A. baumannii carrying the rare blaOXA-237 
was facilitated by transfer of affected patients without communication to receiving facilities.
Extensively drug-resistant (XDR) Acinetobacter baumannii causes significant patient 
morbidity and mortality but remains uncommon in the northwestern United States relative to 
other U.S. regions and Europe.1–4 Acinetobacter baumannii is transmitted by contaminated 
hands, fomites, and possibly an airborne route.5,6 Extensively drug-resistant A. baumannii 
can harbor several chromosomal and plasmid-mediated antibiotic resistance genes, which 
can be transmitted to other gram-negative organisms.7,8
The transfer of patients between acute and chronic health-care facilities increases 
opportunities for disease dissemination if interfacility communication is not robust.9,10 
Clear, timely, and complete communication of patient infection or colonization by organisms 
of public health significance that have potential for person-to-person transmission (eg, 
multidrug-resistant organisms [MDROs], Clostridium difficile, norovirus, influenza, 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis) can prevent transmission between healthcare facilities.11–14 
We investigated an outbreak of XDR A. baumannii infections in Oregon—where the 
pathogen had been rare—in an effort to prevent it from establishing endemicity.
Since January 2012, participating clinical laboratories voluntarily report carbapenem-
resistant A. baumannii isolates from sterile sites (eg, blood, urine) among residents of the 
Portland tricounty metropolitan area (ie, Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas) to the 
Oregon Public Health Division (OPHD) for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) Multidrug-resistant Gram-negative organism Surveillance Initiative (MuGSI).15 
During June 2012, an isolated case of XDR A. baumannii (patient ORAB01, ie, Oregon A. 
baumannii patient 1) was reported by a participating laboratory. The isolate was resistant to 
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penicillins, cephalosporins, extended-spectrum cephalosporins, carbapenems, 
fluoroquinolones, and aminoglycosides. The isolate showed intermediate susceptibility to 
tetracyclines, and was susceptible to tigecycline (using the Enterobacteriaceae breakpoint) 
and to colistin. Because this was an isolated case, the healthcare facility was notified and 
educated to prevent transmission, but no further investigation was performed. In November 
2012, a hospital infection preventionist notified the OPHD of 2 other XDR A. baumannii 
infections (patients ORAB02 and ORAB03).
Our initial review revealed that all 3 cases had 2 healthcare facility exposures in common: a 
skilled nursing facility (SNF-A) and an outpatient wound and infusion clinic (OPC-A) 
outside the MuGSI surveillance area. During December 2012, we conducted simultaneous 
resident and outpatient point-prevalence surveys on a single day at SNF-A and OPC-A. 
Facility staff obtained groin, axilla, and wound swabs for surveillance; specimens were 
processed by the clinical laboratory.16,17 We identified 3 additional cases of XDR A. 
baumannii colonization among the 42 residents of SNF-A (ie, patients ORAB04, ORAB05, 
and ORAB6a), and none among 15 patients at OPC-A. An outbreak linked to SNF-A was 
suspected, so we launched what became a 2-year, multifacility investigation to determine the 
scope of the problem, to identify a source, and to intervene to prevent further spread.
METHODS
Case Definition
A case was defined as the incident isolate from clinical or surveillance cultures of A. 
baumannii resistant to imipenem or meropenem and nonsusceptible to all but 1 or 2 
antibiotic classes in a patient in an Oregon healthcare facility during January 2012–
December 2014.18 Case patient medical records were abstracted using a standardized form.
11
Case Finding
For this investigation, the OPHD requested that 6 large, hospital-based, clinical 
microbiology laboratories retrospectively report since June 2012 and prospectively report 
and submit any isolates from sterile (eg, blood, urine) or nonsterile sites (eg, respiratory, 
wound) meeting the case definition. Together, these laboratories process ~90% of Oregon 
clinical microbiology specimens. Involved facilities were instructed to report A. baumannii 
cases since January 2012. The Washington State Department of Health was notified of A. 
baumannii cases among Washington residents.
Case and Environmental Investigations
Following the December 2012 point-prevalence surveillance study at SNF-A, we conducted 
an environmental survey at SNF-A during June 2013. The OPHD staff obtained 
environmental samples by swabbing high-touch areas in the resident rooms, clinical and 
common areas, bathroom fixtures, and sinks; all environmental samples were processed by 
the Oregon State Public Health Laboratory (OSPHL).19 In response to 2 outbreak cases, 
Hospital-2 performed surveillance on the 2 affected units during July 2013. Hospital staff 
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obtained groin, axilla, and rectal swabs for surveillance; specimens were processed at 
OSPHL.16,17
Susceptibility Testing and Definitions
Routine susceptibility testing was performed in clinical microbiology laboratories using 
Microscan or Vitek, and results were interpreted using the 2012 Clinical Laboratory 
Standards Institute (CLSI) clinical parameters.20 Patient and environmental specimens sent 
to OSHPL were plated on chromogenic media to select for multidrug-resistant A. baumannii 
(CHRO-Magar Acinetobacter, bioMérieux, France); API 20NE (France) was used for initial 
identification. Whole-genome sequence analysis later confirmed the species.
Pulsed-Gel Electrophoresis and Advanced Molecular Testing
Isolates meeting the case definition underwent pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) 
analysis at OSPHL using the ApaI restriction enzyme. PFGE band patterns were compared 
using BioNumerics 5.1 software (Applied Maths, Belgium). A case was considered part of 
the outbreak if the isolate’s PFGE pattern had ≥92% homology with ORAB0121; or if no 
isolate was available for testing, the case shared a common healthcare facility exposure and 
resistance phenotype. The Louis Stokes Cleveland Department of Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center provided testing for the following: antimicrobial susceptibility; blaOXA 
carbapenemase genes; other bla and aminoglycoside resistance genes; molecular typing by 
repetitive-sequence-based PCR (rep-PCR) and multilocus sequence type (MLST) Pasteur 
scheme; and whole-genome and plasmid sequencing.22,23
RESULTS
Case Descriptions
We identified 21 cases (18 clinical, 3 surveillance) of XDR A. baumannii among Oregon (n 
= 16) and southwest Washington (n = 5) residents during the study period who shared 
healthcare facility exposures or isolates highly related by PFGE (Figures 1 and 2). Case 
patients were aged 25–92 years (median, 71 years); 13 patients (62%) were male. Patients 
were admitted to 37 medical facilities in Oregon and Washington; 7 patients (33%) received 
care in both states. In addition, 17 patients (81%) reported admissions to either a long-term 
acute-care hospital (LTACH-A, n = 8), SNF-A (n = 8), or both (n = 1) prior to XDR A. 
baumannii isolation. Index clinical specimen sources were: blood (n = 2), wound (n = 2), 
urine (n = 5), and sputum (n = 9); surveillance sources were axillary (n = 1) and groin (n = 
2). In 4 patients, additional isolates were obtained ≥30 days apart: patient ORAB01 (190 
days: blood and axilla), patient ORAB03 (36 days: urine and urine), patient ORAB6b (563 
days: axilla and wound), and patient ORAB08 (31 days: unknown and bronchoalveolar 
lavage).
Outbreak Investigation
During May 2012, the index-case patient, ORAB01, was admitted to LTACH-A with a 
peripherally inserted central catheter. She developed sepsis 25 days later and was diagnosed 
with an XDR A. baumannii catheter-associated bloodstream infection. The patient’s 
comorbidities included morbid obesity (BMI = 60.3 kg/m2), chronic nonhealing abdominal 
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and lower extremity wounds, tracheostomy, and a chronic indwelling urinary catheter. 
Subsequently, XDR A. baumannii was identified in 7 more LTACH-A patients over 27 
months: patients ORAB08, ORAB12, and ORAB22 (bronchoalveolar lavage); patients 
ORAB17, ORAB18, and ORAB19 (other respiratory); and patient ORAB16 (urine). The 
LTACH-A facility declined repeated requests by the OPHD to perform an inpatient point-
prevalence surveillance study. Instead, the facility initiated admission surveillance cultures 
for evidence of MDROs; no cases were identified (personal communication, G.L.B.). During 
an internal review prompted by the outbreak, LTACH-A identified lapses in its 
bronchoscopy and ventilator reprocessing protocols (ex post facto personal communication, 
G.L.B.).
In September 2012, the index-case patient ORAB01 was transferred to SNF-A for 
rehabilitation (Figure 3). SNF-A did not receive notification that the case patient carried 
XDR A. baumannii. Subsequently, 5 symptomatic cases with matching PFGE patterns 
(patient ORAB02 [sputum]; patients ORAB03, ORAB09, ORAB21, and ORAB23 [urine]) 
and 3 asymptomatic carriers with matching PFGE patterns (patients ORAB04 and ORAB05 
[groin]; patient ORAB06b [axilla]) were identified at SNF-A over a 25-month period. 
Extremely drug-resistant A. baumannii was isolated twice from patient ORAB6: first on 
surveillance culture (patient ORAB6a [axilla]) during the December 2012 point-prevalence 
survey, and 18 months later from a chronic ankle wound (ORAB6b). The June 2013 
environmental survey identified 1 PFGE-matching XDR A. baumannii in 1 of 173 
specimens, namely, from the handle of a linen cart in the unit where 4 cases resided during 
the outbreak: ORAB01, ORAB02, ORAB04, and ORAB06 (Figure 2, ESample#12).
The same strain also spread within Hospital-2. Case patient ORAB08 had a 2-month 
LTACH-A admission complicated by tracheostomy, dialysis, and decubitus ulcers. Seven 
months after discharge, patient ORAB08 was admitted to the medical-surgical unit and the 
intensive care unit (ICU) at Hospital-2, and a bronchoalveolar lavage specimen grew XDR 
A. baumannii identical by PFGE to that of ORAB01. Four months later, 2 additional PFGE-
matching cases were identified at Hospital-2: ORAB14 from the oncology unit and 
ORAB15 from the medical-surgical unit and ICU; neither patient had prior exposure to 
SNF-A or LTACH-A. Surveillance cultures among patients in the ICU (n = 5) and the 
oncology unit (n = 26) at Hospital-2 identified no further transmission events.
Public Health Recommendations and Facility Response
While all licensed Oregon healthcare facilities must have infection control policies in place, 
adherence to such practices is not routinely externally validated. During the outbreak, the 
OPHD instructed affected facilities to audit hand hygiene, personal protective equipment 
use, and environmental cleaning; to reinforce universal precautions for contact with body 
fluids or wounds; and to request and provide interfacility communication upon admission 
and transfer of patients or residents with a history of Clostridium difficile, MDRO, including 
XDR A. baumannii, or other communicable disease. For facilities with current XDR A. 
baumannii cases, the OPHD recommended the following measures: single rooms or cohort; 
daily chlorhexidine baths or wipes to decrease colonization burden; hand hygiene; gloves 
and gown use by healthcare workers during patient care; daily enhanced environmental 
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cleaning; and patient wound coverage when in common areas.24 Case patients with A. 
baumannii colonization at skilled nursing facilities were encouraged to participate in 
rehabilitation and social activities if hand hygiene was ensured, clean clothing was donned, 
and secretions were contained. The OPHD created guidelines for education, active 
surveillance, and augmented environmental cleaning of high-touch surfaces; the OPHD 
assisted facilities to develop a form and process for interfacility communication during 
admission and transfer.25
Advanced Molecular Testing
One resident surveillance isolate (ORABSC) and 16 clinical outbreak isolates (17 of 21 
cases; 81%) were available for molecular characterization (Figure 1, ORABSC not shown). 
All isolates had rep-PCR patterns that clustered with >95% similarity, suggesting clonality.
23
 Multilocus sequence type analysis revealed all isolates as ST2, which corresponds to 
international clone 2, the most prevalent carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii lineage found 
worldwide.26 Importantly, whole-genome and plasmid sequencing revealed that all isolates 
except that in patient ORAB19 carried the plasmid-encoded blaOXA-237, an uncommon OXA 
carbapenemase related to OXA-235.27,28 Details are reported by Hujer et al.23
DISCUSSION
Given the relatedness of outbreak isolates by PFGE and rep-PCR, carriage of a rare 
blaOXA-237 carbapenemase gene, and the distribution of cases, we suggest that introduction 
and rapid dissemination of a single XDR Acinetobacter clone occurred across several 
northwestern US healthcare facilities because patients and residents with risk factors for 
prolonged carriage were transferred without interfacility communication. We combined a 
detailed epidemiologic investigation with whole-genome molecular analysis, thereby 
providing insight on how XDR A. baumannii carrying a blaOXA-237 carbapenemase could be 
introduced and disseminated in a geographical region with historically low XDR A. 
baumannii incidence.29–31 Epidemiologic, microbiologic, and molecular data suggest that 
case patients with persistently positive cultures (eg, from patients ORAB01, ORAB06, and 
ORAB08) could have transmitted the outbreak strain to at least a dozen other individuals. 
Evidence demonstrating that cases were related increased the commitments of facilities to 
further transmission prevention and compliance with public health recommendations.24,32
Risk factors for prolonged A. baumannii and other MDRO carriage include chronic wounds, 
morbid obesity, tracheostomies, or indwelling urine catheters.5,10,14 These characteristics 
favor both a heavy bioburden of colonizing bacteria and a need for more frequent healthcare 
contact, thereby increasing the likelihood of transmission via healthcare worker hands or 
fomites to other patients. Infection control deficiencies, (eg, improper bronchoscope 
reprocessing or inadequate hand washing) in the long-term-care chronic- and acute-care 
settings may have amplified transmission within the facilities. However, not all cases in this 
investigation were directly connected, suggesting other unidentified vectors: unidentified 
carriers, a tenacious environmental reservoir, or even airborne transmission.6
Based on our investigation, we suspect more widespread transmission of A. baumannii 
isolates carrying blaOXA-237 in the Pacific Northwest because 1 in 3 patients received health-
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care in both Oregon and Washington. For example, case investigation at LTACH-A identified 
case patient ORAB07, a patient with multiple comorbidities and multiple admissions to 
several southwest Washington and Oregon healthcare facilities who had been admitted 
several weeks before case patient ORAB01; unfortunately, no isolates were available. 
Phenotypic XDR A. baumannii was isolated from the sputum and urine of patient ORAB07 
multiple times during January–March 2012, suggesting that she may have been the source 
patient for patient ORAB01. Furthermore, evidence that patients did not carry evidence of 
XDR A. baumannii on admission to LTACH-A suggests that acquisition occurred after 
admission by internal transmission.
This outbreak might have been missed if not for a new, limited, voluntary surveillance 
system in Oregon and an astute infection preventionist. Reporting of XDR A. baumannii 
infection is not required by most public health jurisdictions in the United States, and clinical 
laboratories do not routinely test for underlying resistance mechanisms like blaOXA-237 
carbapenemase genes. Collaboration between public health surveillance systems and 
research laboratories, as in this investigation, could facilitate characterization of uncommon 
transmission pathways and new resistance mechanisms suggested by unusual clinical 
outbreaks.23,27,33,34 For example, a search for uncharacterized plasmid-encoded carbapenem 
resistance genes in 10 A. baumannii isolates from Utah, Illinois, California, and Nevada 
identified 3 novel OXA enzymes (OXA-235, OXA-236, and OXA-237), including an isolate 
of blaOXA-237 from California.27 Furthermore, Ou et al35 used whole-genome sequencing to 
show that a clone of A. baumannii can persist over time and across healthcare facilities.
Our investigation and analysis have limitations. First, surveillance for XDR A. baumannii 
was voluntary and likely incomplete. LTACH-A declined inpatient surveillance and cases 
were likely missed; more importantly, this refusal may have impeded identification and 
mitigation of an intrafacility source. This limitation was mitigated by interstate 
communication and extensive case finding with Oregon microbiology laboratories, which 
collectively test ~90% of clinical samples. Second, surveillance case identification could 
have been underestimated because of culture techniques: skin, sputum, stool, urine, and 
wound are preferred for A. baumannii.16,17,19 However, healthcare facilities requested a 
surveillance method that was easy, fast, and noninvasive. To optimize compliance, we 
accepted axilla, groin, and wound specimens as well as urine and sputum, when a catheter or 
tracheostomy was present. Third, we were unable to obtain some isolates (eg, from patient 
ORAB07) and healthcare records (eg, outside of Oregon). Despite these limitations, 
epidemiologic and molecular analyses provide compelling evidence of rapid, regional 
transmission of a rare, plasmid-encoded carbapenemase OXA-237 in a pervasive XDR A. 
baumannii clone.
This outbreak highlights the need for timely and transparent communication of patient and 
resident histories of infection or colonization by MDROs.36 Interfacility communication of 
MDRO status can enable receiving facilities to institute appropriate contact precautions 
immediately upon patient arrival. Interventions focused on decreasing fomite and healthcare 
worker hand carriage can decrease XDR A. baumannii intrafacility transmission.14,24 An 
entire chain of transmission at SNF-A might have been prevented if its staff had been 
notified by LTACH-A of the MDRO status of patient ORAB01. The findings from this 
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outbreak helped to inspire the creation of Oregon Administrative Rule 333-019-0052, which 
mandates written communication of MDRO status for interfacility patient transfer, effective 
January 1, 2014.25
In conclusion, we have described a widespread, 2-year multifacility cluster of blaOXA-237 
carbapenemase-carrying XDR A. baumannii in the northwestern United States. Lack of 
MDRO interfacility communication protocols and a heavy colonized patient likely facilitated 
transmission. Clinical and molecular epidemiology were key to linking cases, creating 
transmission hypotheses, and convincing healthcare facilities to implement interfacility 
transfer communication and heightened infection control processes.
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Extensively drug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii outbreak cases by initial specimen 
collection date, facility, and significant events—Oregon healthcare facilities, 2012–2014 (N 
= 21 individuals). Patient ORAB06 had 2 isolates. Patient ORAB07 did not have an 
available isolate. LTACH, long-term acute care hospital; SNF, skilled nursing facility; OPC, 
outpatient clinic; H, hospital; Survey, surveillance cultures obtained at listed facilities; 
underline, blaOXA-237-carbapenemase gene sequenced from clinical isolate available for 
molecular study.
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Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis of selected outbreak isolates of extensively drug-resistant 
Acinetobacter baumannii—Oregon healthcare facilities, 2012–2014. Patient ORAB01 had 2 
isolates. ORAB, case; Environmental, sample obtained during SNF-A environmental survey 
during June 2013; Non-outbreak isolate, an isolate of carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii 
collected during the investigation, but unrelated to the outbreak.
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Exposure network of outbreak of extensively drug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii—
Oregon healthcare facilities, 2010–2014. Square, LTACH; light circle, nursing home; dark 
circle, hospital; triangle, patient.
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